There is a story we tell ourselves about why leaders exist. It is so old, so woven into the fabric of civilization, that we have largely stopped noticing it as a story at all. The story goes like this: resources are scarce, people compete for them, and without someone to coordinate that competition, manage distribution, and adjudicate conflict, society collapses into violence. Leaders, in this telling, are not a choice. They are a necessity. A structural feature of reality itself.

But what if the necessity is ending? What if the future doesn't need leaders?

That question, which might have seemed radically theoretical a generation ago, is now being raised in earnest by some of the most technically capable people on earth. The possibility of artificial general intelligence (AGI); systems that can perform most economically valuable cognitive work at near-zero marginal cost threatens to dissolve the scarcity foundations on which every human hierarchy from the pharaohs to the Fortune 500 has been constructed. To understand how radical this might be, it helps to trace the argument from its roots.


Scarcity as the Engine of Hierarchy

Before agriculture, humans lived in small bands of twenty to one hundred fifty people. Leadership in these groups was fluid, situational, and constantly checked by group consensus. The best hunter led the hunt. The most experienced elder arbitrated disputes. When the situation changed, so did the leader. There was no permanent hierarchy because there was, relatively speaking, no permanent scarcity. Needs were simple. Nature provided enough — not abundantly, but enough.

The transformation came with the agricultural revolution around ten thousand years ago. Stored grain created something new in human experience: the possibility of accumulated surplus. And with surplus came its shadow twin, artificial scarcity — the condition in which resources exist in sufficient quantity but are distributed unequally through ownership and control.

The first leader who said this is mine did not solve scarcity. He manufactured it.

After Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, 1755

Jean-Jacques Rousseau saw this with unusual clarity in 1755. His Discourse on Inequality argued that human beings in their natural state were essentially content — needs were simple, and there was no systematic domination. The fall came when someone enclosed a piece of land and declared ownership, and others accepted the fiction. From that moment, leaders emerged not to solve natural scarcity but to protect and perpetuate artificial scarcity — to maintain the conditions that justified their own authority.

This is a darker reading of leadership than most civics textbooks provide. But it is a consistent one. Almost every function we associate with leaders — adjudicating property disputes, organizing armies, taxing and redistributing, managing information asymmetries — traces directly to the management of scarce resources or the conflict that scarcity generates.


A Prediction Nobody Remembers

1930 Keynes writes his forecast

In 1930, at the very depth of the Great Depression, the economist John Maynard Keynes published a short essay that almost nobody read at the time and almost nobody remembers now. It was called Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, and it contained one of the most audacious forecasts in the history of economic thought.

While the world economy was collapsing around him, Keynes told readers not to confuse a cyclical crisis for the long-run trend. Step back far enough, he argued, and the trajectory was unambiguous: productive capacity per person had been compounding for generations. Within one hundred years — which puts us at 2030 — the "economic problem," meaning the struggle for subsistence, would be solved. Not alleviated. Solved. He predicted living standards in advanced economies would be four to eight times higher than in 1930. On the material side of his ledger, he was roughly correct.

But the radical heart of the essay was what he thought would follow from this. He predicted the working week would shrink to perhaps fifteen hours — not because of idleness, but because fifteen hours of labor would genuinely be sufficient to sustain abundant lives. The rest would be leisure. And here his anxiety surfaces in the prose, because he was not celebratory about this. He worried that humans had been so thoroughly shaped by the discipline of scarcity that they would not know what to do with themselves in its absence.

The Keynes Problem

Keynes predicted material abundance with remarkable accuracy. What he underestimated was how powerfully existing hierarchies would capture and redirect that abundance and how deeply the psychology of scarcity was embedded in human identity. Productivity gains arrived on schedule. The fifteen-hour work week did not.

He described what he called "purposiveness" which is the orientation toward future goals over present experience that scarcity conditions produce — as a useful neurosis. Civilization needed it to pass through the scarcity phase. But it would need to be shed once that phase ended, like passing through a tunnel into open air. Fail to shed it, and people would generate artificial purposes, artificial hierarchies, artificial scarcities simply to maintain the familiar structure of striving.

That failure to shed it is largely what happened. The abundance arrived, and was immediately captured by expanding desires, by concentrated ownership, by the managerial and political class that Keynes assumed would become unnecessary. Rather than the state withering away, institutions found new rationales for their authority. The leaders did not dissolve into leisure alongside everyone else. They found new scarcities to manage.


The Anarchist Tradition Had It Right

Keynes was not alone in this structural diagnosis, though he arrived at it from a very different direction. A generation earlier, the Russian geographer Peter Kropotkin had argued in Mutual Aid that cooperation, not competition, was the dominant force in both nature and human history — and that in conditions of genuine shared abundance, hierarchical leadership would become not just unnecessary but actively parasitic.

Kropotkin's crucial move was the same as Rousseau's, stated more bluntly: scarcity is largely manufactured by the ownership structures that leaders enforce, not a natural condition requiring management. Remove the leaders, redistribute the abundance, and the entire philosophical justification for authority collapses. What remains is voluntary coordination — people organizing themselves around shared tasks without anyone claiming the permanent right to direct others.

Marx made the same argument through different machinery. His endpoint — full communism — is explicitly a post-scarcity condition. In that terminal state, he wrote, the state withers away because there is nothing left for it to manage. Leaders and governments are, in his framework, instruments for managing class conflict over scarce resources. Eliminate scarcity through technological development and collective ownership, and the entire apparatus becomes superfluous.

That no Marxist state ever reached this destination is a separate conversation. What matters here is the theoretical logic, which is precise: scarcity is the engine, hierarchy is the machine the engine drives, and without the engine the machine has no purpose.


What Remains Without Scarcity

Before accepting this conclusion too quickly, it is worth asking what would remain of leadership if scarcity were genuinely eliminated. The honest answer is: something, but less than we might suppose.

Pure coordination problems exist independent of scarcity. Even in conditions of perfect material abundance, groups face the challenge of synchronizing action — deciding which direction to go, when to act, how to sequence collective effort. These are not about managing competing claims on scarce resources. They are about the mathematics of group decision-making: any time more than two people have potentially different preferences, some mechanism is needed to aggregate those preferences into a single action.

But notice what that mechanism looks like in the absence of scarcity pressure. It looks less like a king, a CEO, or a general, and more like a protocol. A shared norm. A voting procedure. The coordination residue of post-scarcity society might not deserve the name "leadership" at all. It might simply be coordination — which is a very different thing.

Leadership as we know it may be a scarcity-adapted institution that has outlived the conditions that made it necessary.

The anthropologist David Graeber, in his final book The Dawn of Everything, documented societies that maintained deliberate mechanisms to prevent permanent leadership from emerging — seasonal leadership, ritual humiliation of chiefs, voluntary dispersal when hierarchy became too rigid. His argument was that hierarchy is a choice, not an inevitability, and that many human societies have at various points chosen otherwise. The story that we have always needed leaders is itself, he suggested, a story that leaders tell.


The Rupture That Changes Everything

This is the point at which a ninety-year-old essay about economic possibilities becomes urgently contemporary.

Keynes assumed abundance would arrive gradually — continued industrial productivity compounding steadily across generations. What he did not anticipate was a discontinuous jump: a technology that does not incrementally improve labor productivity but potentially replaces the need for labor across entire categories of cognitive work, almost simultaneously, within a compressed timeframe.

1930

Keynes publishes his forecast. Predicts the economic problem solved by 2030 via gradual compounding of industrial productivity.

2022–2024

Large language models demonstrate capability across most categories of cognitive work. The gradual path becomes a potential cliff edge.

2025–2026

AI lab leaders begin publishing explicit post-scarcity forecasts. Amodei's Machines of Loving Grace predicts compression of a century of scientific progress into a decade.

2030

Keynes' original target date. The destination may arrive approximately on schedule, but via a road he could not have imagined.

If you take seriously what people like Dario Amodei are actually arguing and not the hedged public statements but the internal conviction — the claim is that we are within years of systems capable of performing most economically valuable cognitive work at near-zero marginal cost. Amodei has written explicitly about compressing a century of scientific and economic progress into roughly a decade. Sam Altman has gestured at civilizational transformation on similar timescales.

If that trajectory is even directionally correct, Keynes was not wrong. He was describing a destination that turns out to be reachable by a faster, stranger road than he imagined. His 2030 prediction may prove accurate almost to the year, while being entirely wrong about the mechanism.


The Question of Capture

This is where the argument reaches its sharpest and most uncomfortable edge. Abundance delivered by artificial intelligence does not automatically mean distributed abundance. The critical question and the one that Rousseau would recognize immediately is who owns and controls the systems that produce it.

If a small number of companies or individuals control the infrastructure that generates post-scarcity conditions, then scarcity-based hierarchy has not been eliminated. It has been concentrated to a degree without historical precedent. Rather than a million leaders managing localized scarcity, you have a handful of individuals managing the systems that produce everything. The entire apparatus of leadership; its justification, its function, its claim on obedience collapses upward into a single point of control.

This is not a hypothetical concern. The same dynamic that turned agricultural surplus into feudalism, and industrial surplus into plutocracy, is already visible in the ownership structure of the systems being built. The logic is identical. Scarcity is not eliminated; it is repackaged. Access to abundance becomes the new scarce resource, and the leaders of that access inherit all the authority that scarcity has always generated.

The Recurring Pattern

Agricultural surplus → feudal hierarchy. Industrial surplus → plutocratic hierarchy. AI surplus → ? The technology changes. The capture dynamic has proven remarkably stable across all three transitions. The question is whether this one is different enough to break it.

Altman himself has implicitly acknowledged this with his advocacy for Universal Basic Income and OpenAI's original nonprofit structure — a recognition that without deliberate redistribution mechanisms, the abundance his systems might produce would simply reconcentrate at the top. The leaders would not wither away. They would become more powerful, not less, precisely because they control the systems that have made all other scarcity manageable.


The Psychological Question

There remains a deeper problem that no redistribution mechanism fully solves. Keynes worried that humans conditioned by scarcity would not know how to live in its absence. He had a century to work with. The AI scenario compresses that psychological transition into a decade or less.

Human beings evolved under conditions of scarcity. Status hierarchies, dominance seeking, competition for recognition — these behaviors persist in materially comfortable conditions because they were adaptive across most of evolutionary history. Even if material scarcity is solved, the psychology of scarcity may generate new forms of competition: attention, status, meaning, identity. New hierarchies built not around who controls the grain store but around who is most visible, most validated, most recognized.

This would mean that leadership does not disappear in post-scarcity conditions — it simply migrates to new domains. The form changes while the function persists: some people directing others, some people claiming the right to allocate the goods of social recognition rather than material resources. Whether this constitutes genuine leadership or merely the residue of a scarcity-adapted psychology running on empty is a question we have never had to answer before.

We may be about to.


An Ending Without a Conclusion

History has tested the scarcity-leadership connection repeatedly without ever fully breaking it. Every technology that promised to dissolve hierarchy — the printing press, the steam engine, electrification, the internet — instead generated new hierarchies organized around control of the technology itself. The same dynamic may play out with AI.

But there is something qualitatively different about a technology that can replace cognitive labor across essentially all domains. Previous technologies replaced physical labor in specific sectors while creating new categories of cognitive work. The demand for human participation in the economy shifted but did not disappear. If AI eliminates the demand for cognitive labor as comprehensively as previous technologies eliminated the demand for physical labor — without creating new categories of work to absorb the displaced — then the economic basis for most leadership simply ceases to exist.

Keynes thought this moment would come gradually, giving human psychology and institutions time to adapt. He was probably wrong about the pace. The institutions built on scarcity logic are already struggling to adapt to a world that is merely becoming more automated — let alone one that reaches genuine post-scarcity conditions.

The question your grandchildren will answer — perhaps sooner than that — is not whether leaders are needed in a post-scarcity world. It is whether we will actually get a post-scarcity world, or whether the same logic that has captured every previous surplus will capture this one too, producing not the dissolution of hierarchy but its apotheosis: a small group of people controlling systems that can produce everything, governing a world that finally has no material reason to accept being governed.

Keynes was right about the destination. He may have been wrong only about who arrives there first.